We present Aloes, a new technique and system for automatically detecting software errors in smart contracts. Given the Ethereum Virtual Machine byte code of a smart contract and a user specified constraint or invariant, Aloes symbolically executes the smart contract, explores all possible execution paths, and checks whether it is possible to initiate a malicious transaction to cause the contract violating the specified constraint or invariant. Our experimental results show that Aloes is effective in finding new errors in smart contracts. We applied Aloes to check 779 ERC-20 smart contracts against the ERC-20 standard and Aloes finds 232 standard violation errors and 192 vulnerable contracts with no false positive. 26 contracts contain more than one error. 213 out of the 232 errors are zero-day errors that are not reported before.
Introduction
Following the success of the cryptocurrencies [22, 27] , blockchain has recently evolved into a technology platform that powers secure, decentralized, and consistent transaction ledgers at Internet-scale. The ledger becomes a powerful abstraction and fuels innovations on real-world applications in financial systems, supply chains, and health cares, shifting the landscapes of the industries that worth hundreds of billions of dollars [17, 1, 2] . Smart contract deployment is the most important feature of many blockchain systems [27] . Users can develop smart contracts to encode arbitrarily complicated transaction rules and deploy these contracts to a blockchain system. The contracts and the transaction rules are then faithfully executed and enforced by all participants of the system, eliminating any potential counter-party risk of the encoded transactions in future.
Because smart contracts are in fact programs that directly manipulate digital assets, ensuring the correctness of these contracts is very critical. Unfortunately, human programmers often make mistakes and errors. The consequence of programming errors and security vulnerabilities in smart contracts is particularly severe, often leading to tens of millions of dollar losses. For example, the DAO attack occurred in Ethereum is caused by a re-entrance vulnerability in a smart contract program. The attacker exploited the vulnerability and stole digital assets worth 50 million dollars at the moment of the attack. This attack eventually causes the Ethereum development team to implement a community dividing hard fork to recover the stolen fund [13] .
To alleviate the correctness problem of smart contracts, the blockchain community has created many technical standards for common kinds of smart contracts such as digital assets, identity tokens, and domain name service [5, 4, 3] . A technical standard typically defines a set of interface functions that a contract following the standard should implement, together with specifications for each of the interface functions. This community driven effort is partially successful in that most smart contracts now follow these technical standards, but it does not solve the correctness problem. A software error may still cause a contract implementation to deviate form its intended standard behaviors.
Recent work has been focusing on developing analysis tools to detect patterns of software errors in smart contracts, such as integer overflows and re-entrance vulnerabilities [21, 25] . However, these tools cannot detect logic errors where the implementation deviates from the intended specifications. Also these tools tend to suffer from false positives because many detected errors from these patterns are often benign [21] . Furthermore these tools require the access of the smart contract source code and cannot apply to the EVM byte code directly. These drawbacks limit the applications of these analysis tools.
Aloes
We present Aloes, a novel dynamic program analysis tool for detecting programming errors and security vulnerabilities in Ethereum smart contracts. Aloes models the behavior of a smart contract as a state machine where external transactions invoke associated contract functions to drive the state transition. Given a user specified constraint about a set of transactions, Aloes symbolically executes the associated contract functions and uses SMT solvers to determine whether there is a possible assignment scheme of the initial contract state and the transaction input parameters to cause the contract execution violating the specified contract. If so, Aloes constructs the error triggering transaction trace from the assignment scheme corresponds and reports it to the user.
One key design decision of Aloes is to exploit the fact that smart contracts following the same technical standard such as ERC20 are essentially sharing the same set of specifications defined by the standard. Aloes provides an expressive language to allow users to specify invariants and safety constraints from a technical standards. Once developed, these user specified invariants and constraints then can be applied to check all smart contracts that follow the corresponding technical standard. Because all errors that Aloes detects correspond to deviations between the implementation of the contract and the specification of the standard, Aloes does not suffer from the problem of benign errors.
A key challenge to build a symbolic execution engine for EVM byte code is to handle load and store instructions of the contract persistent state. EVM models the persistent state as a flat map that maps 256 bit address to stored values. Load and store instructions in the generated EVM byte code are often paired with a special crypto-hash instruction to compute the address locations of the loaded/stored object The computations in crypto-hash functions are too complicated to handle naively with symbolic execution, because the underlying SMT solver would not be able to decide on the generated satisfiability query. To addresses this challenge, Aloes operates with a customized addressing mechanism for the persistent contract state when running the symbolic execution. This customized mechanism removes the dependency on crypto-hash functions so that it is tractable for the underlying SMT solver. In the same time, the mechanism still guarantees the free of the address collision so that it is functionally equivalent to the original mechanism.
Experimental Results
We evaluated Aloes with a systematically collected benchmark set of 779 ERC-20 smart contracts. ERC-20 is a popular smart contract standard which defines the contract interface and specification for implementing digital assets. In our experiments, each of the evaluated contract corresponds to one kind of digital assets publicly traded in some crypto exchanges. We applied Aloes to check whether these contracts satisfy the total supply invariant and the transfer functionalities defined by the ERC-20 standard. Aloes found in total 232 standard violation errors in these 779 contracts. Out of the 232 errors, 7 errors correspond to severe vulnerabilities that can be exploited by any user in the blockchain and the underlying digital assets are immediately threatened; 56 errors corre-spond to owner backdoors which are only exploitable by the contract owners; 17 errors correspond to subtle constraint violations that are not immediately exploitable given the current blockchain state but they may become exploitable as the blockchain state changes; the remaining 152 errors are non-exploitable standard deviations in customized features.
Out experimental results highlight the effectiveness of Aloes in finding security errors in Ethereum smart contracts. Note that 213 out of the found 232 errors are zero-days errors, i.e., to the best of our knowledge, we believe that these errors are not reported before. The total market cap of these vulnerable zero-day smart contracts is more than 5 billion dollars at the time of writing this paper 1 . In our experiments, Aloes has no false positive. For all vulnerable contracts, Aloes on average found the error within 5 minutes. The constraint development cost of using Aloes is negligible, i.e., we developed one invariant and two constraints that contain 60 lines of code in total for our experiments. See Section 5.4 for detailed results and case studies of found errors.
Contributions
This paper makes the following contributions:
• Aloes: This paper presents a novel dynamic analysis tool, Aloes, which enables users to specify customized constraints and invariants to detect EVM smart contract errors that cause deviations between the implementation and the specification.
• Symbolic Execution for EVM byte code: This paper presents a symbolic execution framework for EVM byte code. Especially, it proposes to replace the persistent state address scheme to make the symbolic execution tractable.
• Experimental Results: This paper presents a systematical evaluation of Aloes on a benchmark set of 779 smart contracts. Aloes found 232 errors in total and 213 out of the 232 errors are zero-day errors. The total market cap of these vulnerable zero-day smart contracts is more than 5 billion dollar at the time of writing this paper. This paper also presents a case study on these found errors and illustrates the challenges of smart contract security.
The remaining of this paper will be organized as follows. Section 2 presents a motivating example to illustrate Aloes. Section 3 presents the technical design of Aloes. Section 4 discusses the implementation of Aloes. We evaluate Aloes with experiments in Section 5. We finally discuss related work in Section 6 and conclude in Section 7. Figure 1 : Simplified source code from BECToken.
In this section, we present a motivating example how Aloes detects an invariant violation error in the smart contract of BECToken. Figure 1 presents the simplified source code of this example. BECToken is an ERC-20 contract [5] deployed on Ethereum blockchain. ERC-20 is a technical standard that defines a set of contract interface functions to implement a digital token asset. Specifically in an ERC-20 contract, the public property or function balanceOf() should return the amount of tokens that the given address owns (line 3 in Figure 1 ); the function transfer() should transfer the specified amount of tokens from the address of the transaction initiator to the specified receiver address (lines 5-13); the public property of function totalSupply() should return the total amount of the circulated tokens (line 2). An ERC-20 contract should also satisfy the following invariant: the sum of token balances of all addresses should equal to the total supply at any time.
In Figure 1 , the public balanceOf map stores the balance of each address; the public totalSupply variable stores the current total supply of the token. BECToken implements transfer() accordingly with these two global variables. Note that these global variables will reside on the Ethereum blockchain permanently so that any full node in Ethereum can access and verify the current BECToken state including the balance of any address. Also note that uint256 is a special large integer type in Ethereum with 256 bits.
However, BECToken implements a customized batch transfer function called batchTransfer(). The intended behavior of batchTransfer() is to transfer the specified amount of tokens from the address of the transaction initiator to each address in a specified array. Unfortunately, there is an integer overflow error at line 18, where the statement calculates the total transferred amount. Specifically, if an attacker creates a transaction and calls batchTransfer() with value as 2 255 and address containing two addresses, amount would become zero after the overflow (recall that amount has 256 bits). This overflowed value in turn would enable the attacker to bypass the security check at line 20. The consequence of this attack is that the attacker could therefore send large amount of tokens that he or she does not own, effectively generating BECToken from the air and violating the ERC-20 standard. Note that this vulnerability was exploited by an anonymous attacker on 2018 April, who sent massive amount of generated coins to crypto-exchanges for profit at the expense of other honest token holders. The market cap of BECToken, which was two billion USD at the time of the attack, evaporated in days [10] . Specify Invariant: We next apply Aloes to BECToken and describe how Aloes could detect this vulnerability. We first provide Aloes the total supply invariant we want to check as Figure 2 . In Aloes, users write invariants in a syntax similar to Python. In Figure 2 , C is a predefined variable as the handle of the being checked contract; ADDRS is another predefined variable to represent the set of all possible addresses. The invariant in Figure 2 iterates over all addresses, calls balanceOf() to retrieve the balance of each address, and then checks whether the sum of these balances equals to the result returned by totalSupply(). There is also a special check at line 4 to make sure that the computation of the sum does not cause integer overflow errors.
Note that the user does not need the access of the contract source code in Figure 1 to write this invariant. The user only needs to know the contract application binary interface (ABI), which is specified by smart contract standards and is typically published by the developers as well. In fact, Figure 1 Figure 2 should be satisfied before and after every function invocation, Aloes automatically generates a function constraint from the invariant for each interface function of BECToken. Figure 3 presents the generated constraint for batchTransfer(). At lines 1-7, the generated constraint ensures that the invariant holds for the initial state of the contract before the invocation of batchTransfer(). At lines 8-11, the constraint invokes batchTransfer() with a symbolic array of receiving addresses and a symbolic integer amount. caller = SymAddr() at line 11 also makes the transaction initiated by a symbolic address as well. Note that symbolic values here mean that these values are external inputs and reflect the fact that anyone can initiate a transaction to call batchTransfer() with arbitrary parameters. At lines 12-18, the generated constraint checks the total supply invariant again to check that the invariant is satisfied after the batchTransfer() call.
Note that users can also write constraints like Figure 3 directly. Such capability is useful when the user wants to use Aloes to check dedicated properties of one function rather than general invariants. In our experiments, we utilized this capability of Aloes to check function specific properties of our benchmark contracts. See Section 5 for more details. Symbolic Execution: Aloes then runs symbolic execution analysis on the contract EVM bytecode to check each of the generated constraint. The symbolic execution engine of Aloes initializes program values in the global states as fresh symbolic variables similar to input parameters of batchTransfer(). The global states include variables like totalSupply and balances in lines 2 and 3 in Figure 1 and blockchain states like the block height and timestamp that might be queried by the contract program. Aloes then sym-
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bolically executes the generated constraint and the contract EVM bytecode to maintain a map that maps each program value to a symbolic expression. The symbolic expression represents the computation of deriving the corresponding program value from initial global states and input parameters. Aloes also maintains a symbolic path constraint, which is the constraint that initial global states and input parameters need to satisfy in order to exercise the current execution path. The symbolic execution engine updates the path constraint when it processes conditional branch and require statements. Detect Error: When the symbolic execution engine processes the check statements (e.g., lines 16 and 18 in Figure 3 ), Aloes uses an off-the-shelf SMT solver [23] to determine whether it is possible find an assignment scheme of initial global states and input parameters such that the check condition is false. If so, Aloes successfully detects an error and the solver will return the error triggering assignment scheme as the error report.
In our example, when Aloes processes the check statement at line 18 in Figure 3 , the solver returns that it is possible to violate this condition by setting value to a large number. Figure 4 gives an concrete example that violates the total supply invariant. With the above assignment, the security check balances(msg.sender)>=amount in line 20 in Figure 1 is bypassed and msg.sender is able to send more tokens to receivers than it owns. After the execution of batchTransfer(), the check condition at line 18 in Figure 3 is violated. Aloes therefore successfully detects and reports this error to the user.
Design
We next formally present the design of the Aloes symbolic execution engine.
Core Language
A smart contract transaction is a tuple T = P, A , where P is the combined byte code program of the invoked contract function and A is an input stack that contains all transaction input parameters including the sender account address. c ∈ Integer Figure 5 presents the syntax of a simplified stack based virtual machine language that we will use to illustrate the symbolic execution engine of Aloes in this section. Similar to the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) and other standard virtual machine languages, a program in this language is a map that maps integers (i.e., program counters) to instructions. The program executes with an execution stack. Given an initial execution stack that contains input transaction values and an initial state of the persistent blockchain storage, the program execution starts with the program counter being zero and ends when the execution reaches the stop instruction. All program values during the execution are integers and similar to EVM all integers have a fixed width of 256 bits. All computations during the execution also happen with 256 bits, e.g., an equal comparison instruction will produce a 256 bit integer zero if two operands are not equal and a 256 bit integer one if two are equal.
The language has four execution stack manipulation instructions, push for pushing an extra constant into the stack, pop for popping the top value from the stack, swap for swapping the last two elements, and dup for duplicating the top value of the stack. The language also has various arithmetic and comparison instructions such as add and eq, each of which pops values from the execution as operands and push the computation result back. jumpi is the jump instruction which checks the top value at the stack and conditionally jumps to a specified program counter.
addrof and addrofmap are instructions to compute the address of a variable, an array, or a map. Each of these instructions is followed with either sload or sstore, which are instructions for accessing the persistent storage of the blockchain. The persistent storage of the blockchain is a flat map that maps 256 bit integer addresses to 256 bit integer values. addrof or addrofmap fetches a global variable slot index and an array index or a map key form the stack, computes a crypto hash, and pushes the hash result to the stack as the address. The followed sload or sstore then access the memory at the computed address. Note that for brevity, the language in Figure 5 omit many features of EVM such as the ether account balance, the gas system, the volatile memory, and miscellaneous blockchain states. Our Aloes implementation supports all these features and see Section 4.1 and Section 4.2 for details.
assume and check in Figure 5 represent the corresponding functions in the user specified constraints. We include them in the language so that we can illustrate how Aloes verifies the constraints. Note that our current implementation Aloes performs symbolic executions on both of the EVM byte code of the checked contract and the user specified constraints together. See Section 4.3.
Small Step Semantics for Symbolic Execution
Execution Environment: The environment of the symbolic execution is a tuple σ = pc, K, S, ψ . pc is the current program counter value which could be an integer, nil (indicating normal termination), or err (indicating errors). K is a stack of symbolic expressions to represent the execution stack. The symbolic execution differs from the normal execution in that each concrete program value in the normal execution is instead replaced by a symbolic expression. This symbolic expression tracks the sequences of computations of generating the program value from initial state values and input values.
S is a symbolic array to represent the persistent storage state. A symbolic array has two operations Store() and Load(). Store(S, E 1 , E 2 ) updates a symbolic array by storing the symbolic expression E 2 at the symbolic index (expression) E 1 and returns the updated array. Load(S, E 1 ) returns the symbolic expression that corresponds to the last stored value at the symbolic index (expression) E 1 . ψ is a symbolic expression to denote the current path constraint. The path constraint in the symbolic execution denotes the constraint that the initial state values and the input values must satisfy to make the current execution path feasible. See Figure 5 for the syntax of symbolic variables, expressions, and arrays. Small Step Semantics: Figure 6 presents the rules of the small step semantics for our symbolic execution. Each rule is of the form σ = I ⇒ σ . It denotes that given the original execution state σ , after executing the instruction I the new execution state can be σ . The rules for push, pop, swap, dup, add, and eq are self-explanatory. They fetch operands from the current execution stack and update the stack with the results accordingly.
The rule for assume updates the path constraint with the assumed constraint. There are two rules for jumpi, one for the true branch and the other one for the false branch. Besides changing the program counter, these rules also update the path constraints to indicate additional constraints on the input and initial state values for exercising the corresponding The rules for addrof and addrofmap take two operands from the stack and uses a hash function Hash to compute the address for the followed store instructions. The rule for sstore updates the symbolic array with a Store operation and the rule for sload pushes a fresh symbolic variable x to the stack to represent the loaded value and puts an additional constraint to ensure that x equals to the value that a Load operation on S returns. Note that Hash denotes a special hash function that converts two symbolic expressions (corresponding to the global variable index and the array index or the map key) into a single 256 bit address. This faithfully matches the behavior of the EVM byte code generated by the Solidity compiler [8] , which uses SHA3 [27] function to determine the final address of a stored object. 1 function Hash(E 1 , E 2 ) :
Input :The global slot index E 1 and the index for the store E 2 Output :The hashed address Address Scheme: Handling the crypto hash functions in the address computation in EVM is challenging. One naive approach is to encode SHA3 computations directly into the symbolic expression. However, the resulted constraint will be too complicated for any SMT solver to solve. Another naive approach is to concretize address values to avoid handling crypto computations symbolically. This approach is adopted by previous work [25] , but such concretization may cause the symbolic expression size to grow exponentially when analyzing contracts with multiple storage accesses.
Aloes instead replaces the address scheme in the addrof and addrofmap with a customized function shown as Figure 7 . Aloes expand the address space of the persistent storage with additional bits to fit both of the global slot index and the key value. This guarantees no collision of different storage objects and it is functionally equivalent to the EVM behavior as long as attackers cannot find collisions in SHA3. More importantly, the computation in Figure 7 is much cheaper for an SMT solver to handle. Section 4.2 will further discuss an implementation level optimization to avoid extra bits on the address space if the stored object is an array or a map of addresses (i.e., most common scenarios). Our experimental results show that the new addressing scheme increase the efficiency of the system dramatically. See Section 5.3. The input to the algorithm is a list of transactions, because a user specified constraint can check the behavior of multiple transactions in sequence. Γ in Figure 8 maintains the set of active execution states and we initialize Γ with the input stack of the first transaction as the execution stack and a fresh symbolic array as the storage state at line 1. Each iteration of the main loop at lines 3-14 selects one active state σ from Γ and symbolically executes on σ for one step with the rules in Figure 6 . For each possible result state σ , it first invokes the underlying SMT solver to determine whether the path constraint is satisfiable at line 7. If not, then it is discarded as an impossible state. Then it checks whether the program counter reaches err, which indicates a constraint violation. If so, it will generate an error report. If not, it pushes the new state back to Γ.
Main Algorithm
When selecting states in line 4 in Figure 8 , Aloes uses the depth first strategy and always selects the new generated state. Instead of bounding the number of loop iterations to make the symbolic execution in Figure 8 
Implementation
We built Aloes on top of Manticore [25] , an open source symbolic execution framework. The original Manticore does not have full supports on EVM instructions, does not support user defined constraints, and handles storage access addressing inefficiently with concretization. Besides the algorithms described in Section 3, Aloes is extended to support all EVM instructions described in Ethereum yellow paper [27] . Aloes uses boolector [23] as its underlying SMT solver to check satisfiability of the generated symbolic constraints during symbolic executions.
EVM Byte Code
Indirect Jump: One difference between EVM and the core language in Section 3 is that the jump instructions in EVM are indirect, i.e., an EVM jump instruction fetches the jump target address from the execution stack. To handle such jump instructions, Aloes checks whether the destination from the stack is symbolic. If so, Aloes gets all possible values from the SMT solver and forks the current execution state for each jump destination. In practice, the current implementation of Solidity compiler guarantees that the jump destination is always constant. Miscellaneous Blockchain State: Global blockchain states such as timestamp and block hight are initialized as fresh sym-bolic variables. This is consistent with the fact that a transaction may occur at any time and any state in Ethereum. Aloes updates these state values accordingly when new transactions are generated. Each transaction is assigned with enough gas to execute and Aloes leverages the gas system so that the system will stop after certain iterations.
Storage Access Optimization
As described in Section 3.2, implementing addrof and addrofmap requires Aloes to recover the data type based on EVM byte codes. EVM provides two instructions sload(addr) and sstore(addr,value) to access the global storage. For Solidity contracts, all variables occupies a slot index p in storage which can be determined at compile time. Unlike statically-sized variables which store their data directly in p, mappings and dynamically-sized arrays compute the data address based on p. To explain this, a dynamically-size array stores its length at address p and the starting point for array data is hash(p, 0). A mapping value with index k is located at hash(p, k). This design is faithfully implemented by Solidity compiler and compiled into EVM bytecode. Aloes takes advantage of this design and recovers data types heuristically based on EVM bytecode, which allows Aloes to limit the size of dynamic types. There are two benefits of limiting the data size. Firstly, the global storage is able to store all data with only 256 index bits. Secondly, limiting the mapping index prevents data corruption between different stores. Instead of extending 256 bits each time (line 2, Figure 7) , Aloes limits the allocated size for each dynamic type so that the address can always computed within 256 bits. In our experiment, Aloes sets the initial length of dynamic arrays to 1 and limits the maximum mapping index smaller than 3.
User Constraints
User defined policies consist of 1) contract function calls, 2) assumptions, and 3) safety constraints. Aloes allows users to write Python script to interact with a contract. Calling a contract function is similar to normal function calls, and the return value is deserialized from transaction return data. Aloes then translates those function calls into transactions and symbolically execute them in sequential order. A user can use assume(expr) to define the preconditions and assumptions of transaction arguments and initial states. The user can also use check(expr) to define safety constraints that transaction executions must satisfy. Aloes handles assumptions and constraints in the same way as assume and check instructions described in Section 3.
Address Pool
In the Python script of a user defined constraint, ADDRS keyword represents an address pool that the script can interact with (as shown in Figure 3 ). When Aloes starts, it first populates the address pool with a fixed number of random addresses. Aloes then statically analyzes the EVM byte code and detects additional addresses using the following heuristic. Different from other integer types, addresses in EVM are 160 bits and the usage of each address is accompanied with a bit operation to extract the last 160 bits from a 256 bit integer from the stack. Aloes collects all detected concrete addresses into the address pool as well.
Memory
Besides global storage S described in Section 3.2, EVM introduces memory, a volatile storage, to store temporary data which will be wiped after each transaction execution finishes. Aloes models memory using a symbolic array similar to the global storage. Note that unlike the global storage, the memory does not use complicated crypto functions for computing addresses so that the address scheme is continuous and simpler.
One challenge of handling the memory is that unlike the rest of EVM programs which use 256 bit integer values, the memory maps 256 bit address to 8 bit values. Therefore storing a 256 bit value from stack to the memory requires the system to break the value into 32 bytes and store each of them separately. This will cause the symbolic execution engine to generate a large number of redundant bit operations for symbolic expressions (as shown in Figure 9 ) if the checked constraints contain intensive memory operations. Such redundant operations will slow down the underlying SMT solver dramatically. To address this challenge, Aloes maintains a cache to optimize memory access during symbolic executions. Aloes detects instruction patterns like Figure 9 which store and load 256 bit values into and from the memory. When the program stores a symbolic 256 bit value into the memory, the cache records the address and the 256 bit symbolic value. When the program loads a symbolic 256 bit value from the memory, Aloes queries the SMT solver to determine whether the loaded address corresponds to only one possible cached address from the cache. If so, Aloes returns the corresponding symbolic value from cache directly.
Evaluation
We next evaluate Aloes with a set of 779 real world smart contracts. The goal this evaluation is to answer the following questions:
1. How effective is Aloes in finding standard violation errors in Ethereum smart contracts?
2. What kinds of errors Aloes find and how many of them are zero-days?
3. How does the addressing scheme optimization affect the performance of the symbolic execution engine in Aloes?
Methodology
Collect Benchmark Contracts: We downloaded all ERC-20 token contracts listed by Etherscan [6] on November, 29, 2018 and obtained the top 779 ERC-20 contracts that have active transactions. We downloaded the application binary interface (ABI) of each contract via Etherscan public APIs. The ABI lists all public functions defined by a contract, which enables Aloes to call contract functions and build symbolic transaction inputs. We also downloaded the verified source code from the Etherscan in order to analyze and classify the vulnerabilities. Note that this is for our manual analysis and Aloes does not require the source code to check a contract. Specify Constraints: We extracted one invariant and two constraints based on semantic of ERC20 interfaces [5]:
1. The total supply should equal to the sum of account balances.
2. The transfer function succeeds if and only if sufficient token is supplied.
3. The transferFrom function succeeds if and only if the token owner authorizes the message sender to do so.
A detailed explanation on how a user checks the invariant and the constraints using Aloes will be provided in Section 5.2.
Apply Aloes: We apply Aloes to downloaded contracts to check three constraints. All experiments are performed on a slurm cluster with two eight-core Intel Xeon E5-2680 processors and 96GB rams on each node. Specifically, Aloes allocates 1 hours and 3GB memory for each contract. For each vulnerable contract, Aloes reports the function name, the violated constraint, and a concrete transaction input that triggers the violation. Note that in order to evaluate the effectiveness our addressing scheme optimization for the Aloes symbolic execution engine, we implemented a baseline version of Aloes that does not enable the optimization and instead attempts concretize the address values whenever it encounters a load and store instruction paired with crypto-functions. We apply this baseline version of Aloes to all of our benchmark contracts and compare the results with the normal version of Aloes. Analyze Detected Errors: Aloes flags 232 errors and we further manually analyze each of them 1) to classify the error based on who can trigger the error and the severity of the error and 2) to check whether the error is reported before and contact the contract owner and relevant stake holders about the issues we found. 1 (declare-fun MEMORY () (Array (_ BitVec 256) (_ BitVec 8))) 2 ; MSTORE(offset,value) 3 (declare-fun v_1 () (_ BitVec 8))(assert (= v_1 ((_ extract 7 0) value))) 4 (declare-fun s_1 () (Array (_ BitVec 256) (_ BitVec 8)))(assert (= s_1 (store Memory offset v_1))) 5 (declare-fun v_2 () (_ BitVec 8))(assert (= v_2 ((_ extract 15 8) value))) 6 (declare-fun s_2 () (Array (_ BitVec 256) (_ BitVec 8)))(assert (= s_2 (store s_1 offset+8 v_2))) 7 ...
8
(declare-fun v_32 () (_ BitVec 8))(assert (= v_32 ((_ extract 248 255) value))) 9 (declare-fun s_32 () (Array (_ BitVec 256) (_ BitVec 8)))(assert (= s_32 (store s_31 offset+248 v_32))) 10 
11
; MLOAD(offset) 12 (declare-fun a_1 () (_ BitVec 8))(assert (= a_1 (select s_32 offset))) 13 (declare-fun a_2 () (_ BitVec 8))(assert (= a_2 (select s_32 offset+8))) 14 ...
15
(declare-fun a_32 () (_ BitVec 8))(assert (= a_5 (select s_32 offset+248))) 16 (declare-fun return () (_ BitVec 256))(assert (= return (concat a_1 a_2 ... a_32))) Figure 9 : Constraints from MSTORE and MLOAD instructions without simplification.
Invariant and Constraints
Total Supply: The total supply invariant requires that no matter which function is executed, the sum of account balances equals to the total supply of the token. We already described this invariant in Section 2 and Figure 3 . ERC20 tokens are designed as assets like securities that can be sent and received, which means ERC20 tokens can be traded and have market value. If the total supply changes unexpectedly due to software errors, it may have significant impact on the market value of each token. We applied Aloes to check if any public function in our benchmark contracts will break the total supply invariant.
Transfer: The transfer function defines ERC20 token's most fundamental functionality, that allows a user to transfer his balances to other users. To secure a token transfer, the contract must guarantee that the sender has enough token to transfer. Otherwise, the token transfer should fail. 1 # Get balances before transfer is called. Token Approval: approve and transferFrom allow a user to authorize a third party to spend his token. A user call approve function to allow a third party to spend tokens in his account and the third party uses transferFrom function to transfer the token. Figure 11 shows the security policies built for approve and transferFrom scheme. At line 9 account acc[0] calls function approve to authorize acc [2] to spend up to values[0] tokens. acc [2] then calls function transferFrom to transfer acc[0]'s token to acc [1] 's account.
A secure transferFrom transaction should check the following conditions. 1) acc[0] has enough tokens to perform the transaction; 2) the transferred token is smaller than acc[0]'s allowance; 3) the allowance and the account balances should be updated correspondingly if the transfer succeeds (line 14-25).
Results
We evaluate Aloes for all 779 smart contracts for policies described in Section 5.2. Figure 12 summarizes our experimental results. Each row presents the results of the corresponding invariant or constraint. The second column presents the total number of analyzed transaction traces. Aloes generated one trace for each contract function from the total supply invariant and therefore checked more traces than the other two constraints. For the rest columns, each column represents the type of errors, which is classified by us manually. Each cell presents two numbers. The first one is the number of found errors and the second one is the number of zero-day errors that are not reported before. The sixth column in Figure 12 shows the number of cases that Aloes fails to give any result, including timeout, memory exceeded, or other unhandled exceptions. We further verified that those exceptions are mostly caused by calling external functions. Figure 13 show the cumulative distribution function of verification time for each unique function in our data set compared against baseline implementation describe in 5.1.
Our results show that Aloes is effective in finding standard violation errors. Aloes flags 232 errors with more than 5 billion US dollar of total market cap and 213 out of the 232 errors are new errors that are not reported before. Our results also show that the symbolic execution engine of Aloes is fast due to our optimizations for handling storage address schemes. We observe that 75% functions can be verified within 10 minutes by Aloes. Without the optimization, only 61% functions can be verified with 10 minutes.
Case Studies
In this section we present one contract source code for each type of vulnerability in Figure 12 . During our verification, we found many similar contracts, which means the contract developer may just simply copy and paste the functions from other contracts without additional check. Severe: Aloes found 7 vulnerable contracts that can be exploited by anyone and may lead to token loss. We further summarize three types of severe contracts.
• Contracts implement the approve without provide the functionality that allows a user to revoke the approval, which may lead to token loss if a user set the wrong approval.
• Contracts allows a user to transfer others token without approval.
• Contracts provides a function but can not be executed(deny of service).
We reported these issues to the contract owner for each of them to mitigate the risk. Figure 14 shows the transferFrom function from Remi-Coin 2 found by approval policy. This function allows an attacker to transfer one account's tokens to the other. At line 4, the condition returns false if amount is higher than the allowance, and it is bypassed when amount is higher then the allowance. Aloes detected this issues because this breaks the approval policy where an account can not transfer more tokens than the allowance. Owner Backdoor: Many tokens protect themselves by authorization, where a group of functions are only accessible by authorized users called owners. However, some contracts leave backdoor for those owners, which provide them with additional privileges such as modifying accounts' balances. Figure 15 shows the mint function from ATL 3 . The mint function allows contract owner to allocate tokens to an address holder. The function first verifies that the transaction is from contract owner(line 1), and the value is not zero(line 0). The contract sets a token limit that the total supply of this token should not be more than TOKEN LIMIT (line 4). The function then update the balance of holder and totalSupply.
Aloes found two issues from this function. First, the guard that token's total supply should less than TOKEN LIMIT can be bypassed by an overflow attack. If the owner set a large value, totalSupply+ value will be larger than 2 256 − 1 and smaller than TOKEN LIMIT. This allows the owner to allocate more tokens than the contract allows. The second issue is that this function allows the owner to change a user's balance to an arbitrary number. Similar to the first issue, if the owner set a large value, holder's balance can be overflowed and can be set to any number. Theoretically Attackable: Aloes detects 17 theoretically exploitable errors that the possibilities of exploiting such contracts are rare. However, reusing the source code of such contracts may increase the risk of being attacked. To exploit such a contract, an attacker may need to acquire large amount of tokens or perform the attack at specific time period. Figure 16 shows the migrate and claimMigrate function from RexToken 4 . Those two functions allows RexToken users to migrate their tokens stored in previous contract to this contract. While executing the claimMigrate, the function increases the sender's balance and the token's total supply respectively without any overflow check. Aloes marks this contract as a vulnerable contract because the total supply policy can be violated if the sender has large amount of token in previous contract. However, we further verified those two contracts on Etherscan main chain and it is not the case for current deployed contracts. Standard Deviation: Some contracts implement their customized features and deviate from the ERC20 standard. Such deviations might be intended and are not exploitable on their own, but such contracts might be misused if the user assumes the contract following the standard. We classified 152 errors as standard deviations. They can be further classified into two types. Firstly, contracts may implement its own logic beside ERC20 interfaces such as locked token or transaction fees. Secondly, many contracts does not implement ERC20 interfaces as specified. For example, some contracts implement transfer without any return value. Based on EVM specification, the function returns 0 if no return value is given which means the transfer function return false even if the transaction succeeds. Such contract is vulnerable if it inter- Transfer(from, to, value); acts with other contracts and they use function return value to verify if a transaction succeeds. Figure 17 shows the simplified transfer function from ParagonCoinToken 5 . Unlike other ERC20 tokens, ParagonCoinToken computes a transaction fee each time a user transfer tokens to the other (line 6-7), which breaks the transfer policy that all tokens should be transferred to receiver's account. We believe this a deviation from ERC20 standard. Note that a user can change the constraint to avoid treating this constraint as vulnerable if desired.
Related Work
Smart Contract Security: Researchers recently have proposed several automated program analysis techniques to help detect security errors and vulnerabilities in the smart contracts. Oyente [20] Transfer (msg.sender, fund, fee); 10 Transfer (msg.sender, _to, safeSub(_value, fee)); vulnerability patterns of transaction-ordering dependency attacks, timestamp attacks, re-entrance attacks, and mishandled exception attacks. Mythril [21] and Manticore [25] are open source symbolic execution frameworks for detecting integer overflows and re-entrance errors. A more recent work, Zeus [16] , converts solidity source code into a customized low level virtual machine language that is compatible with LLVM [19] and then uses existing taint analysis and verification tools in LLVM to detect common vulnerability patterns and fairness issues. Aloes differs from these systems in that Aloes can check contracts against sophisticated user defined constraints for transaction traces. With the generic constraints derived from the standard, Aloes can detect not only common kinds of errors such as integer overflows, but also program logic errors that cause standard violation. Unlike many of these previous systems, Aloes does not suffer from the false positive and benign error problems. Furthermore, Aloes operates with the EVM byte code directly and does not require the source code of the checked contracts.
Maian [24] analyzes execution traces and detects vulnerable contracts that handles ether transfers. TEEther [18] detect paths that lead to attackable instructions that attackers can exploit to steal ether. Aloes is more general than these tools. These tools cannot detect errors that do not involve ether transfers, e.g., the standard violation errors of ERC-20 tokens in our experiments. KEVM [15] formally defines the EVM semantics in K and EVM* [9] translates EVM bytecode to F*. Building EVM semantics allows a user of K or F* to build their own policy for further verification. Unlike Aloes, such verifications are not automated.
Secure Contract Development:
Library such as openzeppelin-solidity [7] provides safe arithmetic operations which avoid integer overflow and underflow attacks. It also provides a basic implementation of standard protocols that can be deployed or extended easily. However, using such libraries are not mandatory. Ironically, BecToken included SafeInt library in its contract code, but it does not use the library for all arithmetic operations. Moreover, such libraries can not prevent the contract from logic errors such as missing authorization. Symbolic Execution: Symbolic execution techniques [11, 12, 14, 26] have been used to improve software security for many years. KLEE [11, 12] is a popular symbolic execution engine on LLVM framework for traditional computer programs. DIODE [26] proposes goal-directed conditional branch enforcement technique to quickly explore execution paths to detect integer overflow errors.
